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PRESIDENT'S NOTES
It is with regret that I announce the
retirement of Comdr. Robert M. Laske
after 7 years as Editor of the Naval War
College Review. Commander Laske,
more than any other individual, has
been responsible for enhancing the
stature of the Review as a respected
professional journal. He published 5 7
issues, bringing to his work superior
editorial skills and high standards of
excellence. His successor as Editor is Lt.
Comdr. Benjamin M. Simpson Ill, who
has been a professor of Strategy and
Policy here at the College. Lieutenant
Commander Simpson's credentials for
his new position are worthy of mention
-8.A. from Colgate in international
relations, LL.B. from the University of
Pennsylvania, two M.A. 's from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
(international relations and foreign
affairs) and a Ph.D. in diplomatic his
tory, also from Fletcher. He is himself
an author and critic in his fields of
interest and is widely known in the
political science and historical com
munities. I am confident that the
Review will continue to prosper under
his leadership.
The next Professional Studies Con·
ference on the Naval War College
schedule, to be held in early April, will
address the subject of "Professional

Military Ethics." The focus will be on
"Obedience, Loyalty, and Conscience,"
"The Military Ethic in a Democratic
Society," "Military Management and
Professional Ethics," and "Institutional
and Individual Responsibility." This
professional conference continues the
policy of exposing our students to
differing views of contemporary issues.
Another recent development has
been the involvement of the Center for
War Gaming in a new series of innova
tive war games developed by the Com
mander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
Admiral Kidd and his principal sub
ordinate commanders personally partici
pated in the first war game, SHARP
EDGE I, in this new series. The results
of this war game, as well as the plans for
the future, will be discussed in the next
issue of the Naval War College Review.

�a�
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For the past 4 years the Naval War College has invited numerous representatives of
the press and television to meet with the students in plenary sessions and in smaller
informal groups. These frank and at times heated discussions have produced a greater
awareness among the students of the role of the news media in a free society. As Mr.
Migdail describes in some detail, it has also led to a greater understanding of the

problems and feelings of the professional military officers.

A PERSPECTIVE OF THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA
by
Carl J. Migdail
It should be apparent after these past
2 days that the characteristics of the
media in our society are diversity and
competition, not conformity. In our
country, fortunately, there is no spokes•
man for the media. l 1 therefore, tonight
speak only for myself as a member of
the media. My comments and my con
clusions are my own, drawn from my
own experiences.
My personal reaction to the Military
Media Conferences is also useful, I
believe, in providing a vantage point
from which to comment on our discus
sions here, our respective roles in Ameri
can society, our relationship to each
other, and what I see ahead for our
country.
When I attended last year's Military
Media Conference, it was an end for me
of a period of almost 25 years without
close contact with the military of my

own country. The conference 1 there
fore, was for me a revelation, a highly
worthwhile learning experience. It en
abled me to catch up, in a 2-day cram
course, to what had happened to the
military since 1950.
Even with only two Military-Media
Conferences behind me, I note contrasts
and changes in attitudes. This reflects
the acceleration of movement through
out the world. Last year, when we met,
the war in Vietnam was still on. Now
the defeat is behind us.
In many respects, looking back over
the years, I find that our two profes·
sions have moved on somewhat similar
courses. We have both, obviously,
matured with the years. We are both, as
we should be, troubled about many
things happening in our own country
and abroad. Many of us, in the military
and in the media, are groping for
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The relaxation of tensions in Europe as a result of d0tente has presented the
leaders of Communist East Germany1 the German Democratic Republic, with
additional problems in maintaining combat readiness and political reliability of the
armed forces. Insistence upon higher standards of technical proficiency, resultfog in

increased technical education of military personnel1 has been one way in which
combat readiness has been pursued. Political reliability has been sought by means of
a revamped and revitalized political organization within the armed forces, and, in this
thoughtful1 well-researched article, Mr. Herspring discusses the measures adopted by
the GDR to insure the readiness and reliability of its military establishment.

THE EFFECT OF DETENTE ON PROFESSIONALISM
AND
POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE EAST GERMAN ARMY
by
Dale R. Herspring
How to deal with the gradual move•
ment toward detente in Europe has
been one of the most troublesome
problems facing East German leaders in
recent years. Few areas exist where
concern over problems associated with a
relaxation of tensions has been more
apparent than in the SED's (Sozialisti
sche Einheitspartei Deutschlands or
Socialist Unity Party) handling of the
NVA (NationaJe Volksarmee or Na
tional People's Army).
The NVA is one of the most modern
armed forces in Europe. 1 In addition to
a modern air force, it possesses a small,
but modern navy and an army of
90,000 men divided into six divisions;
four motorized infantry and two armor.
As a result of high marks earned in past
maneuvers and its strategic geographical
location, the Soviets view the NVA as

an important addition to the Soviet
forces stationed in the GDR.2 Should
MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduc
tions) become a reality and Russian
rather than Eastern European troops
bear the brunt of reductions, it is
probable that the importance of the
NVA within the Warsaw Pact will in
crease even more. The important
position which the GDR occupies in the
Warsaw Pact, like its economic role in
CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance )1 is a useful bargaining tool in
its relations with the Soviets. As long as
the East Germans are able to convince
the Russians that the NVA is both
militarily prepared and politically re
liable, they will be in a good position to
bargain with the Soviets for favors in
other areas.
From all appearances, the Soviets, at
least at present, remain convinced that
Copyright@ 1976 by Dale R. Herspring.
the NVA fulfills both of these
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss1/19
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Writing on the basis of his own experience as a systems analyst on the Air Staff

in Washington, Colonel Tibbetts describes the functions, clients, and performers of

systems analysis in a service headquarters. In this deceptively breezy .3rticle, far more
incisive and introspective than his casual style suggests, the author discusses the
problems and shortcomings of systems analysis from one Pentagon practitioner 1s
viewpoint, but he also makes a persuasive case for the utility of analytic processes in
complementing other inputs to decislonmaking.

A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
by
Colonel Lurry N. Tibbetts, U.S.
What Do '"Analysts" Do? Each of the
service staffs in Washington has an
internal capability to perform systems
analysis, or access to outside analytica�
agencies, or both. The Air Force has the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and
Analysis, with a professional staff of
nearly 100 officers and civilians. In
addition, the Air Staff can call on the
Rand Corporation, Analytical Services
(ANSER), and other not-for-profit con
cerns.
The Army employs the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Operations Re
search) for many analyses, while
<!farming out" additional work to such
as the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA)
in Bethesda, Md.
Navy and Marine Corps efforts are
largely handled by the CNO's Systems
Analysis Division (OP-96) or the Center
for Naval Analyses.

Air

·i,orcc

These groups routinely perform anal
yses of a variety of subjects. The sub
jects addressed can be loosely grouped
into three general areas: (1) Analyses of
major force issues, (2) Supporting
studies, and (3) Technical papers and
Hmfnianalyses."
Analyses of major issues are the
bread and butter studies that address
the essentials of a military service. For
the Air Force, they would include
analyses of the manned bomber, a new
tactical fighter, or an improved ICBM.
For the Navy, major force issues would
include the Trident, aircraft carrier.,,
and the F•l4 fighter. Major Army issues
might be the total number of infantry
divisions, the SAM-D system, or a new
tank. As might be expected, the
Marines' major force issues are amphibi�
ous assault operations and supporting
tactical aircraft.
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WAR, PEACE, AND SOCIETY
IN TIIE l 980'S
A HISTORIAN'S VIEW
Within a generation the world will enter a new millennium. While many
predictions about life in the 21st century have little basis, there are many serious
attempts to study the future in order to aid and to promote technological,

economic, and social planning by posing "conjeatures 11 about life in the coming
century. Professor Preston discusses these attempts, and by using the logic of

historians he evaluates the validity of conjecturing about the future, Long-term
trends which are already beginning to affect human society and unanticipated
factors may subsequently turn out to have been decisive.

by
ProfeSBor Richard A. Preston
History, it is said, stops with the
present. Because historical methodology
depends on the use of written records
and related evidence, and because there
are no records of the future, the his
torical process was long considered only
as one in which an infinite variety of
factors, some of them unmeasurable and

others unforeseeable, and all liable to be
affected by human free-will intervention
or by chance, created a future that was
inevitably unique and discrete, and
therefore unpredictable. From time to
time a scholar claimed to discern pat
terns in history that projected the past
through the present to the future. But
those who attempted in various ways to
analyze or describe what would come,
for instance Karl Marx, Oswald Speng•
ler, Vladimir Lenin, H.G. Wells, and
Arnold Toynbee, all talked in terms of

were usually held in low esteem by
colleagues. The study of the future has,
in fact, only very recently become more
academically respectable than the classi
cal practice of examining the entrails of
birds or the Victorian interest in the
dregs in tea cups. Hence, not so very
long ago, a proposal to discuss the shape
of even ts and society in a coming

decade would have been frowned upon

as educated guessing or even as mere

speculation.

The rapid march of technological
progress in the recent past has worked a
revolution in thought about the future.
The technical developments that are a
dominant feature of modern life require
thorough, detailed planning; and the
close relation between technology and
science, with its strict laws, makes such

planning possible. Furthermore, the
implementation and application of tech
centuries 1 of epochs, or of unstated
nological planning calls for economic
far-off periods. Today they would be
planning that is now facilitated by
called macrohistorians. Macrohistorians
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss1/19
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Since the Cuban missile cr1S1s in 1962, the Soviet Navy has developed a
well-equipped, flexible, offensive force. Shedding its former predominantly defensive
role, the Soviet Navy now possesses not only the largest submarine force in the world
but also a modern surface warship fleet, capable of operating routinely in distant
oceans. There has been much discussion of the effect of the Cuban confrontation on
this expansion. Was that crisis the "catalyst which activated a vigorous Soviet
response,,? Did the Soviets resolve to "turn the tables"? Or1 had they already
planned to expand and strengthen their naval forces as a result of longstanding
political ambitions and a growing U.S. threat? Lieutenant Commander Ullman
maintains that the impetus for the Soviet naval development antedated the Cuban

missile crisis.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
AND SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
MYTHS AND REALITIES
by
Lieutenant Commander Harlan K, Ullman, U,S, Navy
To many Western analysts, one of
the most significant and long,term ef
fects of the United States-Soviet con
frontation in the Caribbean during the
October 1962 Cuban missile crisis was
on the Soviet Navy and its subsequent
expansion in terms of capability and in
scope of operations. According to this
argument. the Soviet uleadership,"
seeing its policies outflanked and over
run because of its maritime I inferiority
vis-a-vis the United States, embarked on
a deliberate plan to develop and to
procure a naval force capable of both
supporting foreign policy objectives and
protecting 0state interests" almost any
where on the world 1s· oceans. Accord
ingly, subsequent evidence, such as the
increase in the scale of Soviet naval
operations (for example, the size and
pattern of deployments to the Mediter
ranean, Indian Ocean 1 and Caribbean

and exercises such as Okean 75) and the
expansion of naval capabilities in ballis
tic missile submarine, (FBM's) as well as
in more conventional force aspects (the
Kiev class VTL/STL aircraft carriers and
2
the Kara cruisers}, is cited as under
scoring the results of the Cuban missile
crisis and Soviet perceptions of naval
inferiority,
Thus, if this argument is correct, it
could be suggested that had First Secre
tary Khrushchev not decided to station
"offensive" missiles in Cuba, the Soviet
Navy would never have been able to
sever as dramatically the umbilical cord
previously linking it to coastal and
anti-invasion defense; anticarrier opera
tions, and support of the army's mari
time flanks. But is it correct?
In order to sort out some of th e
myths from the realities concerning the
impact of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
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ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING
AND
THE STATEGY FOR VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC
Even though he was often described as being ruthless and abrasive to both
subordinates and contemporaries, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King was eminently
successful as both Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
during World War II. His skill, forcefulness, and self.confidence were essential
elements to his success. In his effort to insure victory in the Pacific, he encountered
several obstacles, some of which resulted more from conflicting personalities than

from differences in strategic concepts. Clark G. Reynolds examines some of those
obstacles and describes how they were overcome.

by
Professor Clark G. Reynolds
American naval policy and doctrine
from 1900 to World War ll was oriented
almost exclusively to the Pacific and
Japan (save for World War I), an orienta·
lion thoroughly adhered to by Ernest J.
King at least from the time he earned
his aviator's wings in 1926. Unlike his
interwar contemporaries in the Army
who were either apathetic or pessimistic
about a war in the Pacific/ King and
the Navy in fleet maneuvers and theo
retical studies fashioned a naval strategy
designed to defeat Japan, the ORANGE
enemy. King himself therefore de·
veloped a consistency of thought and
singlemindedness of purpose which
during World War II his peers and
detractors alike found maddening.
In the fleet problems of 1931 and
1 932, as captain of the aircraft carrier
Lexington, King fought mock naval
battles in the waters of the Galapagos

and Hawaiian islands, respectively. In
1932-1933 he war gamed a cross-ocean
offensive against Japan as a senior stu•
dent at the Naval War College. While
Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,
1933-1936, as a rear admiral, King was
Fleet Commander Adm. Joseph Mason
Reeves' choice to command the U.S.
Fleet in the Pacific should war come. In
the rank of vice admiral, first as Patrol
Plane Commander then Carrier Com•
mander in the Pacific during 1937-1939,
King toured American island bases, par•
ticipated in two fleet problems involving
attacks on Pearl Harbor, and devised
carrier tactics. And while a member of
the General Board, 1939-1941, Admiral
Paper delivered to joint meeting1 American
Historical Association and the American Com•
mittee on the History of the Second World
War, Atlanta, Ga., 30 December 1975,
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The 1965 abortive coup by the Communist Party of Indonesia against the
established political order was a unique and extremely important event In Asian
history. Although it was totally unsuccessful and was suppressed in less than 2 days,
the consequences included a massive and bloody elimination of Indonesian
Communists and their sympathizers. Captain Burgess describes what took place
during the revolution and its aftermath. He examines the objectives of the
revolutionary leaders, the means they used, and how and why they failed. In so
doing, he discusses many problems he found inherent in the Indonesian Communist
Party.

GESTAPO-TEN YEARS AFfER
by
Captain L.K. Burgess, U.S. Marine Corps
March l 976 commemorates the I 0th
anniversary of the culmination of a
series of even ts which is one of the

watersheds of contemporary Asian his

tory. These events began in October
1965 with an attempt by the Commu
nist Party of Indonesia (PK!) to over
throw the government of President
Sukarno and establish itself as a revolu
tionary power at a time when similar
Communist attempts in Southeast Asia
were not going well. Indonesian military
forces under the skillful leadership of
General Suharto quickly rallied and
turned the tide against the Communists
and in favor of the established political
order.
Indonesia is as much a keystone to
stability in Southeast Asia today as it
was 10 years ago. Had the PKI been
successful in October 1965, it would
have established a base from which it

could have expanded its control over
the resource laden archipelago.
The significance of the Suharto vic
tory takes on added importance when it
is viewed in the light of the political
developments in Southeast Asia in
1975. Less than a decade ago, many
scholars, analysts, and political leaders
quickly dismissed such notions as the
"domino theory" as so much nonsense
while they proclaimed uwars of national
liberation" were merely civil conflicts of
little matter to the policies of the
United States. Today, after the rapid

and successive loss to the Communists

of three Southeast Asian nations, an
assessment made in 1966 that a PK!

victory would have ensured the spread
of Communist power "like a great nut

cracker with one prong stretching south�
ward from Hanoi and the other north•
ward from Jakarta"1 seems r easonable.
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Both the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted in 1950, and the Military
Justice Act of 1968 were designed to insure that the military justice system does not
infringe on the individual rights and freedoms of armed service members, whiJe at the
same time reinforcing the military ethic and its derivative, discipline. Lieutenant
Colonel Poydasheff discusses these two concepts and how both have been
suc cessfully woven into the present-day framework of the U.S. system of military
justice.

MILITARY JUSTICE
A REINFORCER OF DISCIPLINE
by
Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Poydasheff, JAGC, U.S. Army
The American involvement in Viet
nam generated intense soul-searching,
questioning, and argument among vari
ous segments of American society. In
particular, the My Lai cases and other
incidents focused public attention upon
the existing system of military criminal
law. 1 Many Americans, having little or
no professional contact with the Armed
Forces, were exposed to highly mis
leading and inaccurate generalizations
and conceptualizations concerning a
system that "is now a sophisticated
system of justice. "2 The military justice
system must enjoy public confidence
and understanding, because "a system
of justice is merely as good as the public
believes it to be." 3 There is little, if any,
value in the system if it is not trusted or
understood by the American public.
Unfortunately, some observers
wrongly perceive the military justice

system as a system remote from Ameri
can military ethical considerations,
having no nexus to justice. They see it
as one operating to the prejudice of the
accused by failing to accord him the
procedural and substantive protections
of the judicial process under the Consti
tution and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.4 One writer has
even erroneously asserted that: "None
of the travesties of justice perpetuated
under the UCMJ is really very surprising
for military law has always been and
continues to be primarily an instrument
of discipline, not justice. "5
The Uniform Code of Military Jus
tice does not reflect a congressional
Prepared for the 1975 Annual Conference
of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed
Forces and Society, Chicago, 16-18 October
1975.
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PROFESSIONAL
READING
Abbazia, Patrick. Mr. Roosevelt'sNavy
The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, 1939-1942. Annapolis, U.S.
Naval Institute Press, 1975. 520pp.
The Atlantic Fleet was the first American force to fight in World War II. The
destroyer Reuben James was sunk by a
German submarine on Halloween 1941,
nearly 6 weeks before the attack on Pearl
Harbor. This sinking was probably inevi
table in view of President Roosevelt's
ascent on the ladder of escalation in order
to render necessary aid and assistance to
the British. This ascent was deliberate,
and it was based on the realization that
the security of the United States de
pended upon the survival of Great Britain
in the struggle with Nazi Germany.
Shortly after the 1937 Japanese at
tack on the Panay in the Yangtze River,
President Roosevelt was reported to have
said, "If Italy and Japan have evolved a
technique of fighting without declaring
war, why can't we develop a similar
one?" Starting with the dispatch of Capt.
Royal Ingersoll, USN, to London at th e
end of 1937 to discuss the "possibility"
of cooperation with the British (he was
not authorized to make commitments)
until the President's famous "shoot on
sight" order late in I 941, the Atlantic
Squadron (later the Atlantic Fleet) was
the instrument of what must be a classic
case of escalation.
With admirable thoroughness, Patrick
Abbazia has drawn upon the relevant
U.S. Navy records, including action re
ports and extensive interviews with par�
ticipants, to present a fascinating and
well-written account of how the Navy

fought a war without one being declared.
He also makes good use of tho available
German records. Beginning with a de
scription of Fleet Exercise XX in 1939,
he continues the narrative through the
Neutrality Patrol, tho details of the actual
transfer of destroyers to tho Royal Navy
in 1940, the plans for a preemptive
occupation of Martinique, and the ardu
ous surface and air operations in the
North Atlantic. He even includes a fasci
nating account of Adm. Jonas Ingram's
activities in the South Atlantic.
Telling tho story of what the Atlantic
Fleet did is the great strength of this
book. It is a salty account, calculated to
appeal to naval buffs andserious students
alike. The author conveys with great
feeling and compassion just what it was
like to serve in a pitching, rolling de
stroyer under extraordinarily trying con
ditions in what must be the most abomi
nable weather known to seafarers. Such
sympathetic, personal insigh ts lend an alr
of reality to naval operations and to the
strategy upon which they were based,
which is all too often ignored in contem
porary literature.
The tactical problems in developing
even the rudiments of ASW, to say
nothing of convoy protection, were enor•
mous. Coupled with the growing pains of
an eKpanding navy in which experienced
personnel seemed to have been a vanish
ing breed, these tactical problems might
very well have overwhelmed a less profes
sional navy, The officers and men who
gave their laudable best, and then some,
successfully endured trying conditions
and reduced tactical and operational
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